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Writing Rights: Factors Influencing the 
Strength of Rights Clauses in Post-Communist 
Constitutions 
Ryan Kennedy 
John Ishiyama 
Truman State University 
Whil e political scientists have recognized th e impor -
ta nce of institutions in shaping political development in 
p ost-communist Eastern Europe and the form er Soviet 
Union , there has been relatively little literature that in-
ves tigat es the factors influencing the choice of these in-
s titutions . This paper s eeks to empirically investigate the 
fa ctors that affected the choice of judicial institutions, 
more specifically , the strength of rights clauses in post-
co mmunist constitutions . Further it tests which factors 
(c ultural , economic , ethnic , historical or political ) most 
accounted for the variation among the post-communist 
co nstitutions . Using multivariate anal y tical techniques 
on twenty post-communist countries , we find that the 
mos t important variable is the effective number of actors 
in volv ed in the negotiation process , a finding that sup-
por ts other literature on institutional choice. 
While political scientists have recognized the impor-tance of institutions in shaping political development in post-communist Eastern Europe and the fonner So-
viet Union, there has been relatively little literature that investi-
gates the factors influencing the choice of these institutions. Al-
though institutional choice would seem to be at the heart of po-
litical science , the literature on it in post-communist politics is 
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sparse and progress in this area has been slow (Elster 1993a; 
Frye, 1997; Ishiyama 1997). 
Recently, however, there has been a growing interest in the 
study of institutional choice in political science, specifically in 
the choice of constitutional structures . The simultaneous transi-
tion of the post-communist states in the direction of democratic 
governance has provided scholars an opportune quasi-
experimental environment to test hypotheses regarding institu-
tional choice (Elster 1992; Hellman 1998). These countries have 
also exhibited a striking variety of differences in the process of 
institutional choice. 
Along with the new interest in institutional choice, there has 
emerged a growing interest in the choice of rights clauses, or 
constitutional statements that guarantee basic political rights and 
freedoms such as speech and assembly (Schwartz 1991; Sun-
stein, 1991 a 1991 b; Elster, I 993b ). Partially as a reaction to the 
communist past, most of the transition countries have adopted 
long, detailed rights clauses. Efforts to create strong, meaningful 
protections for rights lie at the heart of the new constitutions 
(Schwartz 1991 ). Unfortunately, most of the secondary analyses 
of rights clauses detailed in the new constitutions have consisted 
primarily of descriptive case studies. While these are useful in 
understanding what is guaranteed and the importance of those 
guarantees, they do not investigate the factors which influenced 
these outcomes. This paper seeks to investigate, empirically, the 
factors that affected the strength of rights clauses in post-
communist constitutions, and tests which of these factors (cul-
tural, economic, societal, historical or political) most accounted 
for the variation among the post-communist constitutions. 
IS THE STUDY OF R IGHTS CLAUSES IM PORTANT? 
The concept of "rights" has many different foundations. From 
being "God-given" to being practical barriers to the excesses of 
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majority rule, rights guarantees have been a mainstay of demo-
cratic theory. Rights guarantees can prevent many different kinds 
of excesses in transitional politics. These include the situation 
where a majority government may be tempted to manipulate 
rights to increase its chances for reelection (Elster 1992; Elster 
1988). Second, a majority may set aside the rule of law under a 
"standing interest" or a "momentary passion" (Elster 1992, 20). 
These are the times where minority rights may be arbitrarily 
taken away to befit a majority interest, or that the majority, in the 
heat of passion, violates the rights of a minority and fails to per-
ceive its true interests. Finally, there is the risk that the majority 
will fall prey to a "standing passion" (Elster 1992). Religious 
fanaticism and ethnic extremism are the usual examples of this 
type of majority passion. The situation in the Balkans makes 
very clear how a majority may fall under such a passion and 
violate the rights of others to the detriment of the social good. 
Thus, rights, in this type of utilitarian model, represent a bulwark 
against excess. 
There of course have been many critics of this conception of 
rights. The most noteworthy of these are the arguments of Ama-
tai Etzioni and Mary Ann Glendon (Glendon 1991; Etzioni 
1993 ). They contend that Western rights culture emphasizes in-
dividual competition for rights and de-emphasizes the responsi-
bilities that necessarily go with the exercise of those rights . De-
emphasizing responsibility creates an increasingly insular soci-
ety, which, according to them, is harmful to the community. 
Some scholars have flatly rejected the notion that the inclu-
sion of rights clauses in constitutions have any affect on politics , 
and hence do not represent important topics of inquiry. For ex-
ample, the existence of a bill of rights does not necessarily result 
in greater respect for those rights . It is pointed out that the com-
munist constitutions had very elaborate rights clauses which 
were not supported by the policies and attitudes of the govern-
VOL. 29 200 l 
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ment. In this situation, rights clauses serve as a "legal opium for 
the masses" (Duchacek 1968, 98). Even the U.S. Bill of Rights 
was ignored for almost a century and a half before becoming the 
basis of much judicial activism . 
As others have noted, rights clauses are also not self-acting. 
In a constitution , there are two different types of structures es-
tablished: those that channel power and those that are outside the 
political spectrum (Elster 1988; Bonime-Blanc 1987). Constitu-
tional structures that channel power, like checks and balances, 
structure the political system in such a way as to make the domi-
nance of a single majority more difficult. Bills of rights often do 
not have any means of enforcement, except through the govern-
ment. Thus , in James Madison's words, they are mere "paper 
barriers " to oppression. Multiple factors influence whether rights 
are enforced , including the attitudes of judges, the culture, the 
number and strength of rights advocacy groups, and any special 
protections enacted in legislation (e.g., funding to support liti-
gants bringing cases to court in protection of their rights) (Epp 
1996; Sunstein 1995). 
While the above are legitimate criticisms, they do not demon-
strate that rights clauses are unimportant , only that they can be 
circumscribed . While very few people would go as far as the 
current chief justice of the Canadian Supreme Court, who called 
the writing of the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights , "a 
revolution on the scale of the introduction of the metric system, 
the great medical discoveries of Louis Pasteur, and the invention 
of penicillin and the laser" (quoted in Epp 1996, 769), bills of 
rights can have several effects on the political environment. First , 
the existence of a bill of rights in a constitution results in a 
valuing of rights in the political culture (Hart 1994; Duchacek 
1973; Duchacek , 1968). Second , bills of rights shape the devel-
opment of political and social movements. Third, bills of rights 
increase the level of intervention and attention to rights by the 
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judicial system (Epp 1996; Schwartz 1992). Fourth, it results in 
the fragmentation of interest groups, who, instead of seeking a 
solution through compromise and coalition building in the legis-
lature, look for more individualized solutions through the courts. 
Finally, even if the rights clauses are a sham, they often become 
unintended standards for reforms and sources of inspiration for 
anti governmental opposition (Duchacek 1968). 
RIGHTS CLAUSES IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The transitions that took place in Eastern Europe and the 
Newly Independent States were marked by a movement away 
from certain communist legacies and the maintenance of others. 
Unlike communist constitutions, the new constitutions did not 
see rights as subject to the will of any group within society. 
Rather, rights were considered natural, outside the control of any 
particular class. Hence, constitutions were designed primarily to 
protect these rights (Schwartz 1991; Elster 1993b). In their range 
and detail, these constitutions go well beyond the US Constitu-
tion (Sunstein 1992). 
The post-communist constitutions contain three generations 
of rights (Sunstein 1992). First generation rights are the conven-
tional political and civil liberties, including rights to property, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Nearly all post-
communist constitutions have guarantees of the right to own and 
inherit private property, which were absent in communist con-
stitutions. There are also guarantees of minority rights as dis-
cussed in the 1990 Helsinki Conference (Schwartz 1991 ), and of 
other fundamental rights that are familiar to the West. 
Second generation rights are positive state protections of in-
dividual well being, including the right to social security, hous-
ing, leisure, and food. These are often seen as the clearest links 
between the communist and post-communist constitutions (Elster 
1993b; Schwartz 1992). Positive rights play a very strong role in 
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the post-communist constitutions. Nearly all the post-communist 
constitutions contain some guarantee for welfare, social security 
and education, creating an interesting interplay between the 
rights guaranteed to the individual and those guaranteed to the 
collective (Howard 1992). 
Third generation rights, or postmodern rights, are societal 
goals and ambitions, such as right to a healthy environment, 
peace, and economic development. Some of these are reflective 
of the abuses that took place under the communist government, 
but others seem to reflect also the increasing importance of par-
ticular issues in governmental affairs. While these rights are al-
most impossible to enforce legally, they are meant to signify the 
basic goals of government policy. 
In the enforcement of these rights, the post-communist con-
stitutions have a several interesting characteristics. Contrary to 
the argument of Ken Jowitt (1992) that the communist experi-
ence reinforced the separation of the official and political realms, 
post-communist bills of rights do not draw a distinction between 
the public and private sector. Both the restrictions and guarantees 
that appear in these rights clauses, theoretically, apply equally to 
both the public and private sectors (Sunstein 1992). Second, al-
most all bills of rights contain provisions for individual duties as 
well as rights (Sunstein 1992). Mandates for military service, 
voting and paying taxes are all included in these constitutions. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATIONS 
While there is little literature that specifically focuses on the 
choice of rights structures in post-communist constitutions, there 
is some literature on institutional choice regarding other political 
structures (such as presidencies, legislative rules, or electoral 
systems). The literature can be divided into five general catego-
ries: the cultural, economic, ethnic, historic, and political bar-
gaining approaches. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCI ENCE 
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Cultural Approach. Rights have long been associated with the 
existence of a "rights bearing culture," that is the willingness to 
deal with the inconveniences associated with the enforcement of 
individua:t-rights. Theoretically, constitutional rights clauses are 
often seen as attempts to offset the most threatening tendencies 
of a political culture (Sunstein 1993; Mueller 1991; Sunstein, 
1991a). On the other hand, constitutions are also seen as reflect-
ing the flaws in the national character rather than counteracting 
them (Elster 1993). The making of constitutions is generally seen 
as a reflection of the society in which they are made and the sup-
port for the rights in that society (Epp 1996; Duchacek 1973; 
Howard, 1992). This approach suggests the following hypothe-
sis: 
Hypothesis 1: The more supportive the culture is of 
individual rights, the stronger the constitutional rights 
clauses. 
Economic Approach. Economic factors are also cited as af-
fecting institutional choice. Economic decline adds new stress 
and volatility to the post-communist political environment. 
Adam Prezeworski ( 1991) has suggested that an increase in 
stress , due to the economic downturns in certain states, will raise 
calls for a strong central authority , which can cope with the eco-
nomic dislocations (see also Mason 1995). Prezeworski 's argu-
ment suggests that bills of rights would also be weaker because 
they jeopardize the authority of a more centralized executive 
authority. From this the following hypothesis can be drawn: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the economic downturn in 
a country, the weaker the constitutional rights 
clauses. 
Ethnic Approach. A third approach in explaining the strength 
of rights clauses is the influence of ethnic heterogeneity . Differ-
ences in political attitudes among ethnicities have been noted in 
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several studies of post-communist public opinion (Mishler and 
Rose 1996; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992). Indeed, ethnicity was 
clearly on the mind of the framers of some constitutions. For 
example, the first draft of the Romanian constitution, contained 
an outright ban on ethnically based parties (Elster 1993), and 
although this provision was eliminated under pressure from 
Western democracies, a similar clause was incorporated into the 
Bulgarian constitution (art. 11 .4). 
Other theorists have also pointed to the effects of ethnic con-
flict on institutional choice. On the one hand, Horowitz (1985) 
suggests that the more ethnically fragmented a society is the 
stronger the push for a strong executive to unify the dominant 
ethnic group . This situation results in weaker bills of rights, as 
these would hinder the freedom of the executive. On the other 
hand, it has also been suggested that the same ethnic fragmenta-
tion could also lead to calls for a weaker central authority and 
more protection of individual rights, especially since claims of 
individual rights could act as a check against the dominance of 
the majority (Smithey and Ishiyama 2000). The ethnic heteroge-
neity literature suggests two contending hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: The more ethnically fragmented the 
country the stronger the constitutional rights clauses. 
Hypothesis 3b : The more ethnically fragmented the 
country, the weaker the constitutional rights clauses. 
Historical Approach. In discussing the post-communist rights 
clauses, one cannot discount the influence of the communist 
legacies. Several authors have highlighted the importance of 
historical context in its relation to the choice of institutions, par-
ticularly the effect of different communist legacies (Ishiyama 
1997; Elster, 1992b; Sunstein , 1992). In dealing with constitution 
writing, Elster (1993, 171) states "the process took place within 
the framework of the existing communist constitutions, thus ef-
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fectively giving them a life after death, since they never mattered 
before the fall of communism." In explaining post-communist 
politics, several scholars hav<;_ pointed to the legacy left by the 
previous communist regime (Agh 1995; Waller 1995; Evans and 
Whitefield 1995; Racz 1993). From this perspective , the nature 
of the previous regime affects the approach to legality taken by 
the successor states. The greater the emphasis on legalism rather 
than patronage in the previous regime , the more likely there 
would emerge an emphasis on individual rights guarantees m 
post-communist constitutions. 
Hypothesis 4: The more open the society during 
communist rule, the stronger the rights clauses in the 
post-communist constitutions. 
Political Bargaining Approach. The political bargaining ex-
planation hinges on the idea that those in power will want to re-
main in power and make institutional choices to guarantee their 
power , while those in the opposition will want to prevent this 
situation from happening . The constitutional order is a product , 
then , of compromise between leaders and opposition. Unlike 
what Elster (1988 , 6) called the "rare moments in a nation 's his-
tory when deep , principled discussion transcends the logrolling 
and horse-trading of everyday majority politics ," post-
communist constitution writing was "closer to labor-
management bargaining than to a rational discussion among im-
partial framers " (Elster 1992b, 16). Thus rights clauses , like 
other parts of the constitution , are the products of political bar-
gaining . In dealing with post-communist presidencies. Frye 
( 1997) has suggested that when a clear "electoral favorite " ex-
isted, more power was invested in centralized political struc-
tures; on the other hand the more fragmented the polity the more 
likely efforts were made to fragment and limited executive 
power. A similar trend has been noted by Pedro Magalhaes 
VOL. 29 200 l 
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( 1999) in dealing with judicial power. He found that Communist 
incumbents adopted institutions that maximized their power in 
the state apparatus according to the results they expected out of 
the next election. This result would tend to suggest that groups 
may try to make bills of rights stronger to ensure their interests 
should they lose the power to have such influence through the 
legislature (Elster 1992). Therefore, the final hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 5: The more fragmented the political 
system at the time of the constitution, the stronger the 
bills of rights . 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Dependent Variable 
To measure the strength of rights clauses, we content ana-
lyzed the rights sections of the new constitutions (normally con-
tained in chapter two of the new constitutions, the exceptions 
being Hungary and the Czech Republic). The coding scheme was 
derived from Elster who contended that two questions must be 
addressed when considering rights-"what rights are included in 
the constitution, and how well does the constitution protect 
them?" (Elster 1992, 21). 
A major problem, however, is how to weigh each type of 
right in the new constitutions. Indeed, different scholars see 
some rights as more important than others. The best example of 
this debate lies in the guarantee of "positive rights" (also known 
as second and third generation rights) in every one of these con-
stitutions. In classic democratic theory, law and democracy con-
sists of two different concepts of liberty-the negative, which 
makes liberty dependent on curbing authority, and the positive, 
which makes it dependent on the exercise of authority (Sejersted 
1988). According to Isaiah Berlin, these two concepts of liberty 
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are "two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the 
ends of life," although each of them has an equal claim to being 
essential ( quoted in Sejersted 1988, 131 ). Some authors contend 
that positive rights serve no practical purpose in the new consti-
tutions and might even cause considerable harm to the enforce-
ment of the more standard negative rights (Sunstein 1991 b; 
Hartman, 1982; Wolff, 1991; Elster, 1998). Other authors con-
tend that positive rights are not only judicially enforceable, but 
are essential for the new democracies (Fried 1978; Schwartz, 
1991; Schwartz, 1992). Even those that are not judicially en-
forceable can be important as an embodiment of the goals and 
attitudes of the society they represent (Schwartz 1991 ). 
Another issue to be considered is the role that duties play in 
these new constitutions. Theoretically , duties would weaken the 
individual's ability to "do what they want," but at the same time, 
some scholars (Glendon 1991; Etzioni 1993) would argue that by 
detailing these duties , the new constitution has set the guidelines , 
which will protect these rights in the long run. In both instances, 
it does not serve the purpose of this paper to take a side on these 
controversies, which show no signs of being resolved any time 
soon. 
We employed a very simple rule when developing a coding 
scheme for strength of rights clauses: when rights are explicitly 
guaranteed they have more power than when they are not. Our 
procedure was based on the idea that the decisions of the judici-
ary will be more readily accepted if they invoked unambiguous 
language (Sunstein 1997). Thus, to answer Elster 's first question 
of what is guaranteed, we use an additive index of the number of 
rights guaranteed . 
To construct this index we formed a list of the general rights 
categories given in the articles included in the bills of rights. 
First generation rights , which are almost unanimously considered 
to be of the greatest importance in the literature, were given dou-
V0L.292001 
12 KENNEDY AND ISHJYAMA 
ble the weight of their second and third generation counterparts. 
The constitutions were then coded by which rights they included. 
Even with this simplified framework, 113 different rights guar-
antees were found in the twenty post-communist constitutions, 
resulting, with weighting, in a maximim score of 179. After the 
coding was complete, each country's total score was divided by 
179, producing a score between 0 and 1. 
The extent to which constitutions provided for protection of 
these rights was measured by identifying seven specific protec-
tions in each of the constitutions. The first, and perhaps most 
important of these was the protection offered by the constitu-
tional courts (see Howard 1992). In order to measure the strength 
of the protection offered by the constitutional court, a scale of 
judicial power, devised by Smithey and Ishiyama (2000), was 
used. This scale is based upon six factors. If the court's decision 
could be overturned by other actors, then it was coded as a 0, if 
not, then it was coded as a 1. Whether the court was guaranteed 
a priori judicial review was also coded, with the scale ranging 
from 0 to 1, and a .5 indicating limited a priori review. The 
length of judges' terms compared to other actors was measured 
as a 0 when the court judges' term was less than or equal to one 
term of the actor with the longest constitutional term, a .33 when 
it was less than or equal to two parliamentary sessions, a .66 
when it was longer than two sessions but still constitutionally 
limited, and a 1 if it was voluntary retirement. How many actors 
are involved in the selection of judges was coded as 0 if there 
was only one specified actor with this power, .5 if there were 
two , and 1 if there were three or more. Who establishes the 
court 's procedures was measured as l if they were established by 
the court and 0 if they were established by other actors. And fi-
nally, how judges can be removed was coded a 0 if they can be 
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removed for any reason loosely described as a violation of the 
law, a .5 if they can only be removed by specific constitutional 
provisions, and a 1 if judges cannot be removed or there is no 
provision for removal. The scores for each country were then 
added together and divided by the total possible to yield a meas-
ure ranging from O and 1 (see Table 1). 
The second protection that was coded was the right to legal 
counsel for cases dealing with rights violations. Government 
guarantees of legal counsel for rights cases can be very important 
in the protection of those rights, especially since many rights 
cases involve those who are not from the privileged or influential 
groups in society (Epp 1996). The third protection is the estab-
lishment of a Parliamentary Ombudsman, whose job it is to in-
vestigate rights violations and manage various public education 
programs on civil rights. As the case of Poland demonstrates , the 
Ombudsman can be a powerful force in shaping the actions of 
the establishment and increasing awareness of human rights 
(Letowska 1995) . The fourth protection is the right to redress 
violations of rights . Holding government officials responsible for 
compensating the victims of their actions if they violate the bills 
of rights should make those officials more responsive to the 
population at large . The fifth is the right to defend all the rights 
guaranteed in the constitution by all means within the law. This 
specific guarantee ensures that all people have the ability to de-
fend their rights, without worry about exclusion due to certain 
factors within their personal lives or within the case . The sixth 
protection is the right to civil disobedience. The right to civil 
disobedience is one guarantee that most states are very reluctant 
to give since it allows for violation of law because of conscience. 
Civil disobedience has a distinguished history in recent decades 
VOL. 29 200 l 
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TABLE 1 
SCORES FOR DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Country 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Ukraine 
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1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
B 
·.: 
0 
' i: 
ca. 
"' .... 
0 
~ ~i 
a," 
t '> 
...... 
=-a: 
0.5 
0.5 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
C D 
1.0 0.5 
1.0 0.5 
0.67 0.0 
0.67 1.0 
0.33 0.0 
0.33 0.5 
0.33 0.5 
0.33 1.0 
1.0 0.5 
1.0 0 .5 
0.67 1.0 
0.67 1.0 
0.33 1.0 
0.33 1.0 
0.0 0.0 
0.67 1.0 
1.0 0.5 
0.33 0.5 
0.3 3 0.05 
0.67 0.05 
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1.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.0 
0.0 
0 .0 
1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.83 
0.50 
0.45 
0.70 
0.47 
0.56 
0.39 
0.56 
0.58 
0.58 
0.70 
0.61 
0.72 
0.39 
0.0 
0.95 
0.42 
0.31 
0.56 
0.53 
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in the protection of rights, from Mahatma Gandi to Martin Lu-
ther King Jr., and was especially important in the collapse of 
communism in several countries . The final protection is the right 
to appeal to international bodies. While in some countries, in-
cluding Belarus, this particular protection is rather illusory in 
practice, it is a potentially powerful protection. It is also an inter-
esting protection in that it gives international judicial bodies 
power superior to domestic constitutional decisions. The number 
of protections guaranteed in the bill of rights were added to-
gether and divided by the total number of protections coded for 
to yield a ratio level scale between 0 and 1. 
The scale for the number of rights was then multiplied by the 
scale for protections in the bills of rights, resulting in an overall 
rights index that scaled from 0 to 1 (with 1 being constitutions 
with the strongest rights clauses and 0 being the weakest. See 
Table 2). 
Independent Variables 
Five independent variables were operationalized to evaluate 
the hypotheses enumerated above: the support for rights in the 
political culture, the severity of the economic collapse during the 
writing of the constitution, the ethnic fragmentation of the coun-
try, the openness of the country in the communist period, and the 
number of actors in the negotiation process and the uncertainty 
of the initial electoral outcome. 
To measure the extent to which the political culture is sup-
portive of rights (RCULTURE), this study uses recent survey 
research (Wyman 1997). Surveys represent popular attitudes that 
should also be theoretically related to the strength of rights 
clauses, even if the polls are not representative of deeper cultural 
attitudes towards rights . The data used was taken from equivalent 
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TABLE2 
SCORES FOR STRENGTH OF RIGHTS CLAUSES 
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Armenia 0.83 0 0 I 0 I 0 0.25 
Azerbaijan 0.50 0 0 0 I 0 0 0.39 
Belarus 0.45 I 0 I 0 0 I 0.26 
Bulgaria 0.70 I 0 0 0 0 0 0.31 
Croatia 0.47 0 I I 0 0 0 0.35 
Czech Republic 0.56 0 0 I 0 I 0 0.27 
Estonia 0.39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.35 
Georgia 0.56 0 I 0 0 0 0 0.24 
Hungary 0.58 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.26 
Latvia 0.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 1 
Lithuania 0.70 0 0 I 0 0 0 0.26 
Macedonia 0.6 1 0 0 0 I 0 0 0.32 
Moldova 0.72 I 0 I I 0 0 0.31 
Mongolia 0.39 I 0 I 0 0 0 0.18 
Poland 0.0 0 I I 0 0 0 0.38 
Romania 0.95 0 I I 0 0 0 0.26 
Russia 0.42 0 0 I I 0 I 0.33 
Slovakia 0.31 0 0 I 0 I 1 0.30 
Slovenia 0.56 0 I I 0 0 0 0.45 
Ukraine 0.53 0 0 I I 0 I 0.35 
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questions in the New Democracies Barometer II and the New 
Russia Barometer II. A set of paired statements was given to 
each of the respondents and they were asked to pick the one that 
was closer to their view. They were 
• It is most important to maintain peace and order in 
our society . 
or 
• It is most important to have personal liberty, the right 
to do all one wants without state interference. 
The percent of positive responses to the latter statement made 
up the score for a rights supportive culture, ranging from O to 
100, with 100 being the most supportive of rights. Data was col-
lected for fourteen of the twenty cases. 
Operationalization of the severity of economic decline was 
based on the assumption that the perceptions of government do 
not change immediately when an economic downturn occurs, but 
rather a sustained economic downturn is what tends to result in 
stronger central authority (and hence circumscribed individual 
rights) (Mishler and Rose 1996). Therefore, the measure em-
ployed was based on the average annual percent decline in real 
GDP for the period two years prior to the writing of the latest 
constitution (AVGGDP) . 
Ethnic fragmentation is measured in this study using the Her-
findahl-Hirschmann Index of concentration for ethnicity (HH) . 
While this index was originally devised by economists to meas-
ure the fractionalization of corporate market shares , it has also 
proven useful in electoral studies (Taagepera and Shugart 1989) . 
The formula for the index is 
HH = IP/ 
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Where Pi represents the fractional share of the ith component, 
which is squared and summed across all components. In this 
case, the components are the shares of the population made up of 
various ethnic groups. This sets up a scale between O and 1, with 
1 representing perfect ethnic homogeneity, and values tending 
toward O representing extreme fragmentation. 
To measure the differences between regime types in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, Kitschelt (1995) con-
structed a useful three-part typology of communist regimes: pat-
rimonial, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and national consensus 
communism. The first, patrimonial communism, relied heavily on 
hierarchical chains of personal dependence between leaders and 
followers, with low levels of inter-elite contestation, popular in-
terest articulation and rational-bureaucratic professionalization. 
Moreover, these systems were characterized by a heavy empha-
sis on "democratic centralism" which fit well with the hierarchi-
cal structure of dependence between leaders and the led. In this 
category, Kitschelt placed Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and most of the rest of the former Soviet Union 
(coded as 1). 
In the second type, bureaucratic authoritarian communism, 
inter-elite contestation and interest articulation were circum-
scribed, but the level of rational-bureaucratic institutionalization 
was high. In this category, Kitschelt placed the former German 
Democratic Republic, and the Czech Republic , as well as Slova-
kia (coded as 2). The third type of system (coded as 3) was na-
tional consensus communism, where levels of contestation and 
interest articulation were permitted, and there was a degree of 
bureaucratic professionalization. In essence, the communist 
elites allowed for a measure of contestation and interest articula-
tion in exchange for compliance with the basic features of the 
existing system. In this category Kitschelt places Poland and 
Hungary, as well as Slovenia and Croatia. Also within this cate-
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gory, as "borderline" cases, were the three Baltic states, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. Although these states had been absorbed 
by the Soviet Union, there was a remarkable degree of intra-
regime contestation and the tolerance of the demands of the na-
tional independence movements, at least far more so than in 
other parts of the USSR (Kitschelt 1995). 
Finally, the amount of electoral competition and uncertainty 
was measured by the number of "effective" political parties at 
the time of the first legislative election following the adoption of 
the latest constitution (EFFECTIV) (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989). An ideal measure would have been the actual number of 
actors involved in the negotiation process and the "roundtable" 
talks that negotiated the transitions from communist rule. How-
ever, since "actors" had hardly coalesced at the time of the tran-
sitions, we use a "second best" strategy of measuring the number 
of actors after the initial elections. We assume that the number of 
effective parties resulting from the initial elections roughly re-
flects the number of effective actors in the negotiation process. 
The number of effective parties is based on the share of seats 
each party or organization receives in the lower house of the 
legislature using the formula: 
EFFECTIV = 1/Ip/ 
. Where p; represents the fractional share of the i1h component 
(seat shares in the lower house of parliament for each party in the 
first parliamentary election), which is squared and summed 
across all components 
Twenty cases were chosen for this study based on the fol-
lowing criteria . Each of them had to have some legitimate expe-
rience with democracy, defined as having at least one free and 
competitive election between 1991 and 1995. This omits several 
of the Central Asian states including: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
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Turkmenistan , Tadzhikstan, and Uzbekistan. In all of these cases, 
elections had been essentially rigged or the competition was ex-
tremely limited. These criteria also excluded Bosnia-
Herzegovina , where the political process was disrupted by a 
bloody civil war. Table 3 presents these twenty cases. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUS IONS 
To test the relationship between the independent and depend-
ent variables , a multivariate regression model was employed. In 
this model, we employ an ordinary least squares procedure . 
Standardized coefficients (Beta) and tests of significance are re-
ported , as well as standard tests for multicollinearity (VIF or the 
variance inflation factor) . Table 4 illustrates the results of these 
tests. 
In Table 4, the rights culture variable was not shown to be 
significantly related to the strength of rights clauses ( coeffi-
cient=-.233 , p=.346) therefore rejecting hypothesis 1. Average 
decline in GDP for the two years previous also did not show any 
significant relationship (coefficient= .286, p= .298), which does 
not support hypothesis 2. Examination of ethnic fragmentation 's 
effect on the strength of rights clauses failed to show a signifi-
cant relationship (coefficient=.069, p= .788) . Thus, we must also 
reject hypotheses 3a and 3b. Finally, the type of communist re-
gime prior to democratization did not relate with the strength of 
bills of rights (coefficient=- . I 17, p=.638) refuting hypothesis 4. 
There was one independent variable that showed a significant 
relationship with the dependent variable , the number of effective 
parties in the first parliament after the adoption of the constitu-
tion (p=.018) . The direction of this relationship is positive and 
fairly strong (coefficient=.527) which supports hypothesis 5. 
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TABLE3 
SUMM ARY OF DATA FOR TWENTY STATES 
Country 
Armenia O.iO 0.87 5.00 2.44 
Az erbaijan 0.09 0.81 - 19.45 5.29 
Belaru s 0. 12 0 .63 - 15 .25 12.66 17 
Bulgaria 0.08 0 .74 -ID.40 2.56 14 
Croatia 0. 13 0.63 -15 . 10 3 3 .34 35 
Czech Republic 0. 10 0.89 -10.30 2 4 .44 19 
Estonia 0.02 0.50 -22.35 3 5 .38 35 
Georgia 0.06 0.51 -16 .60 3.85 
Hungary 0.06 0.81 -2 .60 3 3.24 38 
Latv ia 0 .00 0.39 -21.55 3 6.06 28 
Lithuania 0.06 0.65 -26 .20 3 2.99 35 
Macedonia 0.08 0.47 -9.80 2.91 
Moldo va 0.08 0.45 -15 .05 2.62 
Mongolia 0.04 0.81 -8 .75 2.74 
Poland 0. 11 0.95 -2 .20 3 5.71 34 
Romania 0.08 0.80 -9 .25 4 .07 22 
Russia 0. 17 0.65 - I 1.60 8.77 20 
Slovakia 0. 15 0.75 - 10.40 2 4.59 12 
Slove nia 0.04 0.83 -9.30 3 6.33 40 
Ukraine 0.23 0.58 -12 00 13.33 17 
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Moreover, the adjusted R square of .326 indicates that a con-
siderable amount of the variation in the dependent variable is 
accounted for by the model. There is also no significant problem 
with multicollinearity as indicated by the variance inflation fac-
tor (VIF) scores (see Fox 1991). 
Of the approaches discussed above, only the political bar-
gaining approach was supported by the evidence. This result is 
TABLE4 
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND COLLINEARJTY DIAG-
NOSTIC FOR STRENGTH OF RIGHTS CLAUSES IN 
POST COMMUNIST CONSTITUTIONS 
Standardized Significance Variable Coefficient VIF 
(Beta) (P) 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.069 0.788 1.775 
Economic Performance 0.286 0.298 1.964 
Previous Regime Type -0. l 17 0.638 1.680 
Effective Number of Parties 0.527 0.018 1.088 
Rights Culture -0.233 0.346 1.612 
consistent with the findings of other scholars who have noted 
that the number of actors involved in the bargaining process is 
the crucial variable in explaining institutional choice (Frye 1997; 
Ishiyama 1997; Smithey and Ishiyama, 2000) In other words, 
this finding suggests that the strength of rights clauses is largely 
determined by the amount of uncertainty in the outcome of the 
initial election and the degree of competition in the political 
system. The results also supported the thesis that the stronger the 
competition among political groups, the stronger the structure of 
the bills of rights . It would seem from these results that the more 
uncertain a group is about being able to achieve their agenda 
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through legislative action, the stronger they make the overarch-
ing legal clauses to protect against the whims of the majority. 
These results are also supported by several other empirical 
studies on other parts of institution choice, including choice of 
the powers of the presidency (Frye 1997) and the judiciary 
(Smithey and Ishiyama 2000; Magalhaes 1999). When the re-
sults of these studies are taken as a whole, it would seem to sug-
gest that political bargaining plays a much larger role in the in-
stitutional choice process than is suggested in much of the lit-
erature. Indeed, unlike other approaches which focus on back-
ground conditions to explain institutional outcomes (such as 
culture, economic performance or ethnic conflict) the bargaining 
approach explicitly contends that institutional choice is not 
merely a reflection of an environment but the result of crafted 
compromises among political actors. 
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